Abstract
Introduction
Past EU referendums suggest that union leaders are 'out of step' with their membership (Hyman 2010) . In 2012, however, even the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) , that hitherto supported all European Treaties, rejected the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in thé Economic and Monetary Union (Fiscal Treaty) . In order to explain rising Euroscepticism of workers and unions it is worth looking back to the mid2000s. We do so by comparing union and media referendum debates on the EU Constitution in France with the debates on the Lisbon and the Fiscal Treaties in Ireland.
These debates are comparable. The EU Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty contained the same substantive provisions, with the exception of its nomenclature (Craig 2010) . The Fiscal Treaty, in turn, was about making budgetary discipline commitments, which were present in all EU Treaties since 1993, all the more explicit. As is commonplace with EU referendums, that are affecting national constitutional orders (Erne and Blasser 2018) , they triggered broad debates and high voter turnouts. We have also selected these debates as Irish and French industrial relations systems and growth models differ (Baccaro and Pontusson 2016; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 2013; Hall 2018) . The EU's new economic governance regime (NEG) also affected the countries in different ways. The EU directly intervened in Ireland already in 2010; while in France, NEG's impact became visible only ten years after the 2005 referendum (Amable 2016; Erne 2015: 348) . Thus, national differences hardly explains why voters with lower incomes and without higher education have rejected EU Treaties in greater numbers in both countries (Brouard and Tiberj 2006; Lehingue 2007; Sinnott and Elkink 2010; Sinnott et al. 2012; Storey 2008) .
Our paper aims to challenge the cultural value change paradigm (Welzel and Inglehart 2017) , according to which we should not have seen such a revival of class voting. Incidentally, strong attachment to this paradigm may also explain why Inglehart and Norris (2016) ignored the decisive class vote in their Brexit referendum analysis (Becker et al. 2017) . Furthermore, our findings also question national institutionalist approaches that assume that national union movements would be affected by EU integration in very different ways (Scharpf 2010 ). Yet, both Irish and French unions have become increasingly EU critical over the last decade, despite their apparent embeddedness in different national growth models.
1 Whereas the Irish union movement supported the Amsterdam Treaty, there was no pro-European consensus as regards the Lisbon and Fiscal Treaties (Golden 2016) . After the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, even the most Eurosceptic French union confederation, the CGT, accepted the EU and Euro as a given (Pernot 2001) . In 2005, however, the referendum debate revealed how short-lived this pro-EU consensus was, as not only the CGT but also the reformist confederation FO rejected the EU Constitution (Groux 2005) . The mean position of union interventions in the French referendum debate was negative, by contrast to business groups or other civil society organizations (Statham and Trenz 2013: 140) .
With this article we aim to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics that are driving EU politicization and labour Euroscepticism in the public sphere. To this effect we analyse the salience of different frame types in referendum debates . The first type frames Euroscepticism in cultural terms, emphasizing workers' supposedly strong attachment to 'pre-modern' primordial values (Hooghe and Marks 2004, 2006) . The second, socioeconomic frame-type relates labour Euroscepticism to the increasingly neo-liberal direction of the EU. Both frame types have been used to explain Euroscepticism. Yet, the construction of these frames is in itself subject to political 'classification struggles' (Bourdieu 1989) , which is complicating scientific analysis. To capture the frames used in referendum campaigns, we have therefore chosen the software package Alceste that allows inductive lexical analysis. By contrast, most content analysis packages use a deductive approach, which means that a coder must categorize each phrase of a text according to a predetermined classification system. The more a classification system is subject to classification struggles, however, the more problematic the deductive approach becomes. Alceste, in turn, does not cluster a textual corpus based on a pre-determined category system. By contrast, it is generating its own textual clusters inductively. Thus, we not only use Alceste because it enables us to analyse larger bodies of text, but also because it is promising more reliable results in a context fraught by intense political classification struggles. Concretely, we analysed first all referendum campaignrelated articles published in Le Monde and in the Irish Times respectively on the Lisbon Treaty and the Fiscal Treaty. Subsequently, we conducted a similar analysis of all worker or union-related articles published by six French and eight Irish media outlets. As social groups exist only if they are representing themselves, we complemented our analysis with an assessment of union documents and interviews with union leaders. Before presenting our findings, however, we will explain our methodological choices in more detail.
How to study Euroscepticism comparatively?
EU referendum debates can be observed at individual, organizational and systemic levels. Most studies, however, are located at either the micro or the macro level, as it is relatively easy to analyse individual voter attitudes or to measure the salience of different EU politicization frames in the media (Zürn 2016) . The emergence of new electoral cleavages (Kriesi et al. 2008 (Kriesi et al. , 2012 , however, alone cannot explain the politicization of the EU integration process. The formation of new political divides also depends on the emergence of corresponding 'organizational networks' (Bartolini 2000: 26) ; hence our focus on unions.
References to collective action by workers are largely absent in the EU politicization literature (Hoeglinger 2016; Hutter et al. 2016; Zürn 2016) , even if they took an active part in the referendum debates, as shown by Statham and Trenz (2013: 140) and our analysis. Politicising Europe , for example contains no references to unions and only one reference to strike action. This is remarkable, considering the increase in contentious action in response to EU directives and the EU's new economic governance regime (Crespy 2012; Erne 2008; Stan et al. 2015) . Certainly, it is difficult to track these developments by quantitative methods, notably ever since the Commission's statistical arm Eurostat decided in 2009 to discontinue its strike data time series, allegedly for budgetary reasons (Dribbusch and Vandaele 2016) . The existing literature in the field, however, not only neglects the organizational (meso) level (Zürn 2016) . Approaches that aim to get a better understanding of EU politicization by measuring the salience of different frame types in EU integration debates also encounter an additional fundamental methodological problem.
This problem becomes apparent when one is reading the single phrase on strike action in Politicising Europe: 'Another example in 2009 was unofficial strikes against EU directives taking precedence over jobs for British workers, as jobs were given to European contractors' (Dolezal et al. 2016: 133) . First, this presentation of the Lindsey oil refinery strikes as a dispute between British and European workers does not seem to be supported by the corresponding case study research (Ince et al. 2015; Meardi 2012: 113) . Second, the quoted phrase also raises tricky methodological questions regarding deductive content analysis of media debates: How should a coder categorize the quoted phrase if it would appear in a newspaper article? Would it fall into the cultural or the economic type of frames in political conflict over European integration (Grande et al. 2016: 186) ? Whereas parties, namely the radical right or the greens, may have clear 'action oriented sets of beliefs' that enable coders to classify their statements into mutually exclusive frame types, the classification of labour-related statements is more complicated. Single sentences may not only contain several meanings, but also justifications that belong to opposite frame types (Hoeglinger 2016: 34) . This puts coders in a difficult position.
As noted by Bourdieu, 'the categories of perception, the schemata of classification, that is, essentially the words, the names which construct social reality as much as they express it, are the stake par excellence of political struggle, which is a struggle to impose the legitimate principle of vision and division ' (1989: 20) . This does not mean that social agents can construct anything anyhow. But by virtue of their position in objective social space, social actors' points of views of social reality can acquire a 'truly real power of construction' (Bourdieu 1989: 18) . For this reason, one cannot explain the higher inclination of workers to vote no in EU Treaty referendums without a concomitant analysis of the perception of this reality by agents that possess particular 'symbolic power' to interpret reality, namely policy-makers, journalists, but also trade unionists and social scientists themselves (Bourdieu 1989: 23; Gombin and Hubé 2009) .
The French referendum debate on the EU Constitution is a good case in point. There is a striking consensus in leading journals that that 'fear of an inundation of "Polish plumbers"' would have dominated the discourse that led to its rejection (Etzioni 2007: 29-30 ). Nicolaïdis and Schmidt (2007) also refer to the 'emblematic figure of the "Polish plumber"' in order to frame the debate about the free movement of services within the EU as a conflict between its old and new member states. And for Favell (2008) the 'ugly French debate about the "Polish plumber" during the EU constitutional vote in May 2005 was but the most visible example' of the 'great electoral reward to be had by populist politicians using the "threat" of open doors eastwards ' (2008: 703) . The Polish plumber theorem has acquired a degree of supremacy that renders it self-evident.
Incidentally, the 'Polish plumber' entered at a late stage into the French referendum debate, following a controversial press conference of EU Commissioner Bolkestein (Sciolino 2005) . The 'Polish plumber' theorem enabled Bolkestein to discredit left-wing opponents of the Bolkestein directive and the Constitution by portraying them as xenophobes (Crespy 2012; Heine 2010) . This facilitated the framing of the debate along a cosmopolitanism versus nationalism cleavage, despite strong transnational union resistance against the Bolkestein directive. This framing not only influenced the Laval judgment of European Court of Justice (Joerges and Rödl 2009) , it also prevailed in social theory and shaped empirical research (Kriesi et al. 2008 (Kriesi et al. , 2012 . Whether labour Euroscepticism has been driven by economic or cultural frames, however, cannot be established by deductive analysis. Hence, our choice of Alceste that can analyse large corpuses of texts inductively and therefore excludes the coding biases inherent to deductive text analysis.
The Alceste Methodology: Its Content, Strengths and Limitations
We gathered 3,424 articles that had been published by leading media outlets during the referendum debates in France (Constitution: 2005) and Ireland (Lisbon 1: 2008 , Lisbon 2: 2009 and Fiscal Treaty: 2012 . The lexical analysis, however, is based on seven separate textual corpuses described below and all 31,913 fragments of sentences, called elementary context units (ECUs), contained in all articles. Our analysis includes all referendum-related articles published by a given media outlet five months before and one month after each vote took place. This enables us to capture the referendum debate and the post-referendum analysis. We proceeded in two steps. First we assessed the dynamics of the general referendum debates based on an analysis of all referendum-related articles published by Le Monde and The Irish Times. Then we analysed all ECU's published in all referendum-related articles that were also specifically referring to workers or unions published in almost all national media outlets. A total of seven lexical analyses were thus undertaken as indicated in Table 1 .
The seven corpuses of text were examined using Alceste's automated cooccurrence analysis, which aims to make 'sense of a word based on its natural context' (Illia et al. 2014: 354) . Alceste identifies how words appear together in a particular sentence fragment and benchmarks this against the entire corpus of articles included in the particular analysis. Hence, discourse is considered a semantic space and a word is assessed based on the position it takes in this space (Illia et al. 2014) .
The use of Alceste allowed us to overcome a limitation that is likely to occur in the manual coding of text. Its inductive method is appealing, as it allowed us to control the 'classification struggle' effects mentioned above. Lexical analysis Table 2   Table 3   Table S6   Table S7   Table S8   Table S9   Table S10 Source: Own.
Alceste differs from deductive content analyses that are carried out on the basis of ex ante categories, as it does not rely on a priori coding. By contrast, it assesses the heterogeneity of the sentences that make up the entire corpus of articles, considering words as indicators of degrees of textual variation between sentences (Béthoux et al. 2007: 79) . Then Alceste progressively identifies several clusters of words (labelled lexical classes) that are each characterized by a specific vocabulary. To do so, Alceste first splits the texts up into fragments of sentences or ECUs, in order to assess whether an analysed word appears in them or not. Words that are very frequent (a, the, etc.) or words that are very rare are not considered. Through an iterative process of descending hierarchical classification, all ECUs are distributed into two classes that have as little words in common as possible. In several consecutive rounds of analysis, the larger of the two is divided along the same line to get the greatest dissimilarity of vocabulary between the newly defined classes. The Alceste analysis does not point out all themes that may be mentioned in the articles. Instead, it highlights the most specific and relevant lexical fields that compose a textual corpus, that is the ones whose vocabulary is the most consistent and systematic. The absence of a theme that one might have expected to find is thus an interesting result in itself, indicating that the texts are predominantly structured along other lines. In sum, Alceste first constructs its lexical classes on the sole basis of words' co-occurrences. Then it automatically describes the distance or proximity between the different lexical classes that have been identified and specifies what each class refers to. The relations between classes, however, still need to be interpreted by researchers. This interpretative work was based on our assessment of (i) the words that are (over or under) associated with each class, (ii) the most representative sentences that are related to each class, and (iii) additional auxiliary variables that we assigned to each article, that is newspaper name, publication month, pre-or post-referendum period, referendum identifier (e.g. Lisbon 1 or 2 referendum).
The French case: Analysing the 2005 EU referendum debate
The campaign on the EU Constitution gave rise to a passionate public debate in which unions took an active part. In addition, the media also contributed to the 'educational and informative dimension of the campaign' (Sauger et al. 2007: 59-60) . Its intensity was reflected in the high turnout of 70 per cent. Table 2 shows the 7 lexical classes that were identified in the analysis of the French 'general debate' as analysed through the 659 articles containing 7,542 ECUs from Le Monde.
A first distinction appears between the politics of the referendum campaign (classes 2-4-6-3-7) that accounted for more than 70 per cent of the ECUs and the policy and polity content of the EU Constitution. The analysis shows that the media drew more attention to the power struggles between different political actors rather than to the EU Constitution's implications for union, etat-membre, compétence, domaine, principe, article, conseil, charte, fondamental, parlement, qualifié, juridique, unanimité . . . marché,économie, croissance, concurrence, euro, social, emploi, zone, stabilité, développement, monnaie, competit-, libre, objectif, banque, pacte, progrès, . . .é lecteur, classe, maastricht, ans, droite, vote, aujourd'hui, intellectuel, français, gauche, moyenne, quart, clivage, diplôme, extrême, profession, chômage,électorat, mécontentement, ouvrier . . . si, nous, dire, France, faire, Chirac, notre, hypothèse, peuple, chance, vrai, oblige, message, prendre, lui, entendre, avance, . . . je, ai, suis, vous, gens, veux, dis, crois, sais, tu, moi, on, nous, pense, collègue, voter, hésite, impression, choses, vérité, famille, . . . Président, Chirac, chef, assemblée, ministre, elysée, Raffarin, mardi, janvier, presse, Zapatero, constitutionnel, lundi policy making and the French political entity or polity. More than a third of the ECUs refer to the referendum-related activities and (internal) affairs of political actors. As the calling of a French referendum is a deliberate political act, it is not very surprising that there is a corresponding lexical cluster, namely class 3. As class 7 is by far the largest one, however, the articles focus even more on the effects the campaign had on a profoundly divided left, namely on the divisions between (Socialist vs Communist Party) or within left-wing organizations (Socialist Party; CGT). As a consequence, the lexical analysis does not identify a coherent slogan or a dominant argument supporting the Yes vote or the No vote. It shows that the public debate offered each of its participants -be it a politician, a unionist or a civil society representativethe opportunity to construct the sense s/he gave to his/her own Yes or No vote (Pirat 2007) . The lexical analysis also confirms that the bone of contention was less 'Europe' in itself than the competing interpretations of what the EU is, or should be. In that sense, after the breach of the Maastricht Treaty, the 2005 referendum represents an important step in shifting the nature of the 'opposition to Europe' in France. The appeal for 'another Europe' and the will to change Europe gained ground on more traditional Eurosceptical positions, even among those who historically supported European integration (Bouillaud and Reungoat 2014) . The fate of the social dimension of the EU, in connexion with its economic policies, stands at the core of this new appeal (Béthoux 2015) . As Brouard and Tiberj (2006: 266) state it: 'The novelty is clearly the perceived threat to the social fabric produced by European integration, which has also involved citizens who previously approved of this process and who do not fear for the future of the nation among a multicultural community'. The politics framework of the campaign is thus closely linked to its polity and policy basis. While the institutional and legal dimensions that affect the polity are gathered in class 1, the social and economic dimensions that relate to the Constitution's policy content appear in class 5. It accounts for only 11 per cent of the total ECUs but it does represent a significant part of those referring to the policy dimension: the importance of the socioeconomic frame in the French debate is thus underlined, with diverging views on the effects European economic policies have on social progress and employment issues (class 5).
The socioeconomic focus is also visible in the post-referendum articles trying to explain the No vote success (class 2). In coherence with the prereferendum frame, socioeconomic arguments are put to the forefront through words such as 'classe moyenne, profession, diplôme, ouvrier, chômage' (middleclass, occupation, diploma, worker, unemployment) . Not only do they indicate that the results are more systematically analysed in socioeconomic terms rather than in culturalist ones but they also point out that the greatest attention was paid to the votes from people belonging to the working and the middle classes. This appears also in class 6, dedicated to individual voters' testimonies, in which voters deal with the complexity and family or professional future and by embedding their choice in their own socioeconomic experience (Lehingue 2007) . In that perspective the Bolkestein directive, perceived as a 'social threat', acted as the missing link between the Constitution's content and the voters' daily lives. This is especially the case for working class people who otherwise tend to express indifference towards European integration (Duchesne et al. 2013 ). Yet if the controversial directive acted as a trigger in French citizens' growing interest in the referendum campaign, it was neither the only factor that framed the campaign in socioeconomic terms, nor an element which added a xenophobic dimension to it, as the analysis of the labour-related articles shows. The lexical analysis of these 102 articles containing 1,406 ECUs leads to four very unbalanced classes (see Table 3 ), isolating first the most predominant and most specific one, which accounts for 45 per cent of ECUs. Class 2 deals with the deep crisis that affected the CGT when its national committee took the position to campaign for a No vote in February 2005, whereas Thibault, the then CGT leader, wanted his union to abstain. The crisis, described as a rank-and-file revolt (Hyman 2010: 15) , was largely commented on by the press, as it mirrored the cleavages that were dividing the Socialist Party at the time. Politics prevailed over policy also in the specific labour-related media debate. But as shown above, the two are closely linked as the discussion on European economic policies and the future of Social Europe fuelled most of the dissension. The CGT's Euroscepticism was motivated by socioeconomic rather than ethnocentric concerns, as stressed by the national official in charge of CGT's campaign for the rights of undocumented migrant workers (Blanche interview: 2010; Kahmann 2015) .
Accordingly, in the labour-related analysis, the intense debate over Social Europe, social rights or the Charter of Fundamental Rights leads to a specific class, with arguments from the Yes-and the No-sides standing alongside each other (class 3). The latter express scepticism regarding the social content of the EU Constitution and the desire to find effective answers to urgent social issues; the former consider the EU Constitution as a step forward towards a more social Europe, thanks to the inclusion of the Charter, as also stated by the ETUC. In this context, the early endorsement of the Constitution by two prominent CGT unionists triggered a lot of attention (Decaillon and Retureau 2004) , due to the CGT's past rejection of the European integration process as a capitalist project. Even though the CGT leadership had adjusted its position towards the EU before it was admitted to the ETUC in 1999, the internal debate over the Constitution revealed that the majority of the CGT activists still perceived the EU as a neo-liberal project, as demonstrated by the No-vote recommendation adopted by CGT delegates against the will of the executive in February 2005. The corresponding clustering of socioeconomic terms in class 3 suggests that socioeconomic rather than cultural cleavages played a predominant role in the EU referendum debate within the French labour movement. This is also explained by the fact that socioeconomic issues were debated in reference to the European and to the national context. Articles published in the right-wing newspaper Le Figaro and in the economic paper, La Tribune, are characteristic of class 4, which refers to the social protests that occurred in France in early 2005 in relation to the social reforms launched at the time by the government. The fact that the French EU referendum campaign took place in a context of social protest gave it a largely dominant 'social perspective' (Sauger et al. 2007 ). The social dimension of the Constitution was less debated per se than it was put in relation to the social concerns that were expressed at the same time at national and individual levels -with unions then organizing national protest days and relaying individual claims.
The lexical class dedicated to voters' testimonies is here the second largest one. In the left-wing papers Libération and L'Humanité in particular, a clear focus is put on the voice of workers and that of unionists, expressing their fear of restructuring processes and of relocations. References to the Bolkestein draft directive are frequent in class 1 and almost systematically link it to the neo-liberal and technocratic face of the EU that the Constitutional Treaty would reinforce according to these testimonies. In comparison, the lexical analysis does not show a connection between the Bolkestein project and any explicit fear regarding Central or East European workers: as in the general debate analysis, there is no mention of the 'Polish plumber' among the most representative words of any lexical class. Culturalist vocabularies around words such as patrie, identité, national, tradition, etc. may have been used in some articles but this did not happen frequently or systematically enough in order to be identified in a specific lexical class. Whereas socioeconomic references clearly predominate, cultural ones do not appear as structuring. A CFDT official, who had been in charge of European affairs, confirmed that references to Eastern workers have not been vivid in the French context and in union debates over the past few years (Mermet interview: 2010) .
In contrast to the CGT, however, the CFDT's positioning during the 2005 debate did not result from an internal debate between contradictory positions. The CFDT support for the EU Constitution was grounded in its will to be 'a true actor on the European scene' (Mermet interview: 2010) in line with its long-lasting involvement in EU affairs (Pernot 2001) . In 2005, the CFDT support was so strong that its leaders took the Yes-vote for granted. As a result, according to this official, CFDT leaders did not try enough to convince those who might be more sceptical among its rank-and-file. Since the mid-1980s, the CFDT acted as a strong supporter of the European project, 'resolutely adopting the role of acculturation agent of French society to Europe' (Pernot 2001: 528) . In retrospect, however, it seems that EU policy issues had not been sufficiently debated within the union. The 2005 No vote thus represented a break in its history: Europe is not so much celebrated anymore in Europeanist terms. Instead, CFDT leaders focus more on local, national, or global issues, leaving the EU level aside. This 'drop in interest in European issues', however, would not simply be a direct result of the 2005 'trauma', but reflect also the transformation of socioeconomic EU governance since 2008. The EU would increasingly be seen as 'the problem rather than as the solution' (Mermet interview: 2010). Accordingly, in 2012 the CFDT also signed the May Day appeal of all union confederations that urged the incoming French president to renegotiate the Fiscal Treaty.
In sum, both the lexical analysis of the EU referendum debate and our qualitative assessment of the corresponding internal union debates suggest that socioeconomic issues explain the growing salience of Euroscepticism within the French labour movement best.
The Irish EU Treaty referendums debates in 2008, 2009 and 2012
As the Lisbon Treaty was changing Ireland's constitutional order, it had to be approved by referendum. For the same reason, the Irish government also decided to put the Fiscal Treaty before the people.
Whereas Table 4 summarizes the findings of the lexical analysis of the general debates as reported in all 2,250 Irish Times articles on Lisbon I, Lisbon II and Fiscal Treaty referendums, Tables S6 and S7 (and S9 in the Online Appendix) present the findings in each case. As in the French case, the different clusters produced inductively by the Alceste analysis match the paradigmatic distinction of three overarching dimensions of the political used in political science. There is an overarching politics dimension, which includes terms that relate to the power struggles between the players involved in the debate. There is a policy dimension, which relates to the policy content of the Treaties. And there is a polity dimension that relates to the institutional implications of the Treaties.
The Lisbon I debate produced a single policy-related class, which included terms across all policy areas. In the two following referendums, however, socioeconomic terms not only became increasingly salient, they also began to appear in distinct lexical classes. In all Irish debates the lexical analysis points to a single polity-oriented class, which became increasingly dominated by economic governance-related terms. Finally, politics also played an important role in all cases, as shown by the classes that relate to the politics of Yes-and No-campaigns, opinion polls and vote results.
Whereas the first general Lisbon I referendum debate was not dominated by a particular policy issue, the general lexical analysis of the second Lisbon II debate (cf. Table 4 and Table S7 in the Online Appendix) revealed four distinct classes: (i) economic dimensions; (ii) EU's democratic constitution; (iii) policy areas covered by the EU's legal guarantees for Ireland; and (iv) social dimensions. Hence, socioeconomic issues became an increasingly important feature in the debates.
In the Lisbon II debate, the Charter of Fundamental Rights played a particularly important role in the social dimensions cluster, arguably as a carrot to attract union and working-class support. In the Fiscal Treaty debate, however, no social cluster could be identified. Instead, 'EU economic governance' (18 per cent), the 'conditions of bailout' (17 per cent) and 'economic dimensions' (11 per cent) dominated the debate (cf. Table 4 and  Table S9 in the Online Appendix). Hence, the 'social carrot' of the Charter was replaced by the stick of bailout conditionality, as Irish access to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) was made conditional upon the ratification of the Fiscal Treaty. Political leaders have dominated EU-related discussions in the Irish public sphere; however, in the case of the Lisbon II referendum civil society organizations, including unions, played an increasingly important role (Fitzgibbon 2013) . Arguably, this increase in interest can help us explain an increase in the lexical classes and the socioeconomic dimension that accompanied the debate on Lisbon II. Here, organized interests actively engaged and voiced their opinions on the EU Treaty. In addition, the change in economic context after the beginning of the 2008 recession also reshaped debates. Interestingly, two policy-oriented classes with socioeconomic terms feature. These can be divided into a class which expresses a social democratic flavour (class 4) and another class which is more neo-liberal in orientation (class 5).
Class 4 was characterized by terms such as 'charter, right, social, collective and bargaining' and 'freedom, case and judgement'. These terms refer primarily to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the CJEU's Laval Quartet ruling, respectively. These two clusters were also a feature of debates between unions. In fact, it is during the Lisbon II debate that clear divisions between unions can be identified. Much of this debate hinged on the importance of the Charter. This was done quite explicitly and on a collective basis as a number of pro-European union leaders -notably from the public sector -formed the 'Charter Group' lauding the Charter of Fundamental Rights as being important for securing workers' rights. This campaign group emerged so as to draw attention to and capitalize on the inclusion of the Charter (Horan interview: 2012). Yet, the group also made the progovernment argument that the Treaty was central to job creation and recovery: 'The global economic crises and its impact here in Ireland also makes ratifying the Lisbon Treaty essential to give hope to the thousands who have lost their jobs and the many more fearful for their job security' (Charter Group 2009). As mentioned, there was another grouping of unions, which included Unite, the TEEU and SIPTU that remained sceptical in its outlook and argued that the Charter would not necessarily lead to greater protection for workers (Kelly interview: 2012; O'Connor interview: 2011) . After all, union strength would primarily depend on workplace organization rather than statutory rights (Whelan interview: 2012. Nevertheless, social and economic issues, by way of enhanced social protection and job creation, were important campaign features. Notwithstanding the outcome, the use of social and economic carrots by the Charter Group and the government attracted criticism from Unite whose leadership considered it an example of 'speaking out of both sides of their mouths' and a 'hangover from [social] partnership' (Kelly interview: 2012).
Once the decision was made to put the Fiscal Treaty before the electorate, a significant proportion of the debate (28 per cent) focussed on the socioeconomic content of the Treaty. The lexical analysis shows that two dimensions dominated the policy oriented debate. The terms 'bank, bailout, Euro and market' highlight the conditionality dilemma that unions faced in deciding whether to support or reject the Treaty. While opting for the latter, on the one hand, amounted to self-exclusion from the ESM, acceptance of the Treaty, on the other hand, implied the institutionalization of an austerity agenda. To offset this Hobson's choice faced by Irish voters, a positive spin was put on ratification. This can be detected in lexical class 7 which accounts for 11 per cent of ECUs and promoted an orthodox economic argument characterized by terms such as 'investment', 'jobs', 'export' and 'economy'. What the lexical analysis shows is thus a noteworthy absence of issues other than those of a socioeconomic nature. This demonstrates that socioeconomic arguments were of greater importance over arguments which attribute increased Euroscepticism to a strong attachment to non-materialist, national values. The latter do not show up as significant structuring elements of the debate through the lexical analysis.
We also analysed all worker or union-related articles published by seven leading national newspapers and RTE.ie using two corpuses, that is one for Lisbon I and II and one for the Fiscal Treaty case. The resulting lexical classes are presented in Table 5 .
By comparison to the general debates, socioeconomic policy issues played an even more important role in labour-specific Lisbon Treaty debates. The lexical class 8 'social dimensions' (22 per cent) is clearly the biggest class, whereas class 2 'economic dimensions' covers 10 per cent of the analysed corpus (cf. Table 5 and Table S8 Ireland (European Council 2009), only represents 9 per cent of the corpus. Table S8 in the Online Appendix also shows that class 5 is positively related to the Lisbon I, whereas class 2 'economic dimensions' is positively related to the Lisbon II debate. This also mirrors the new context of the Lisbon II debate after the 2008 crisis. In contrast to the Lisbon debates, however, social policy dimensions were also absent in the labour-specific Fiscal Treaty debate. The entire policy related debate was covered by a single economic policy oriented class, namely class 3 on the 'bailout conditionality' (cf. Table 5 above and Table  S10 in the Online Appendix). Similar to the general debate, inter-union discussions were shaped by the conditionality of the Treaty. The Fiscal Treaty was seen as an 'incomplete solution' (ICTU 2012) and the lack of a social carrot, which was replaced with an austerity stick, was duly noted. Consequently, for the first time since the Single European Act, ICTU did not adopt a formal position on a European Treaty. The moderate ICTU leader David Begg circulated a synthesis paper to affiliated members. Begg was critical of the Treaty on the grounds that the economic crisis was being used by those to recast the European project away from Delors' Social Europe, in favour of a largely neoliberal E(M)U. Citing Draghi's hawkish remarks in the Wall Street Journal, Begg identified the Fiscal Treaty as the embodiment of fiscal conservatism and austerity and through which Social Europe would be dismantled. In addition, the supply-side formula effectively ruled-out a demand-side remedy of boosting growth. Notwithstanding this, Ireland's predicament as a programme country was recognized which meant that unions were 'between a rock and a hard place . . . with the gun of ESM pointed at our heads' (ICTU 2012) .
In addition, our analysis of the Fiscal Treaty debates generated a class in both the general (class 2, Table S9 ) and specific (class 4, Table S10) debates that are of interest because of their socioeconomic implications. Both of these lexical classes belong in the polity category and point to the politicization process affecting European integration. Not only does the classification of terms such as 'Merkel', 'Hollande', 'growth' and 'austerity' into the same cluster herald the Europeanization of the Irish political discourse, which is a significant development, but also suggest that the debate is structured along a Merkel versus Hollande, or respectively an austerity versus growth spectrum. This counters the claim by those who hold that Europe is debated in cultural terms and underlines the importance of socioeconomic factors also in the post-Delorsian phase of the EU integration process. Given Hollande's failure to renegotiate the Fiscal Treaty and the negative social impact of the EU's new economic governance regime, however, Eurosceptic views are continuing to gain grounds within the Irish labour movement (Golden 2016) .
Conclusion
Since the mid-2000s, French and Irish unions have become more Eurosceptic. To boot, French and Irish workers have rejected EU Treaties in greater numbers by comparison to any other social group. This article therefore aims to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics that are driving labour Euroscepticism and the politicization of the EU in the public sphere. The rise of Euroscepticism among workers and unions has been explained in two ways. The first explanation frames the rise in cultural terms, emphasizing workers' alleged primordial attachment to their nation. The second explanation uses socioeconomic frames, linking Euroscepticism to the increasingly neo-liberal direction of the EU. Typically, the salience of competing frames in referendum campaigns are established through deductive content analysis. This, however, is problematic as the categorization of a phrase as socioeconomic or cultural is in itself subject to political classification struggles. This article therefore presents the findings of an inductive lexical analysis. The Alceste software package allowed us to analyse 3,424 articles containing 31,913 phrases (ECUs) published during referendum debates inductively.
Our analysis shows that socioeconomic terms dominated the general, and specific labour-related campaigns in both countries. This is a surprising result, given the ongoing rise of cultural explanations for Euroscepticism (Hooghe and Marks 2006; Inglehart and Norris 2016) . According to a deductive analysis of EU debates in France and four Western European countries, cultural and economic frames would be equally important (Grande et al. 2016: 192) . In another analysis of EU debates in France and five West European countries, cultural frames account for 39.9 per cent and economic frames for 34.4 per cent of all frames used (Hoeglinger 2016: 109) . Statham and Trenz (2013: 132) , in turn, analysed the salience of different frames in the French EU Constitution referendum debate and classified 36.6 per cent of them as cultural, 14.5 per cent as social and 26.7 per cent as economic. Whereas the findings of these deductive text analyses 'only partly support the expectations of the cultural shift hypothesis' (Grande et al. 2016: 287) , our inductive lexical analysis is supporting an even more radical rebuff of the cultural shift hypothesis.
Cultural clusters are absent in our inductive analysis. This does not mean that cultural terms are never mentioned in the articles but it implies that they are not mentioned that often or developed that much. And most importantly, when they are, they tend to be closely linked to socioeconomic issues, which then encompass them. Neither did any anti-European nationalistcultural cluster nor any pro-European multicultural cluster emerge out of our inductive lexical analyses. This is true for both the general debates as well as the specific worker-or union-related debates in both France and Ireland. This striking difference between existing deductive studies and our inductive analysis may result from various factors. First, the automated inductive approach used by Alceste allowed us to analyse textual corpuses that were much bigger than those used by researchers who had to classify each article or sentence manually. Whereas Hutter et al. (2016 ) or Hoeglinger's (2016 only analysed selected phrases derived from one or two newspapers per country, our corpuses include: a) all phrases of all articles that where published in a Le Monde or The Irish Times article that referred to the referendum; b) all phrases of all articles published in almost all national media outlets that referred to the referendum and unions or workers. Second, Alceste's automated clustering also systematically prevented the classification struggles that are making it so difficult for coders in deductive studies to allocate phrases to distinct frames. Furthermore, the salience of cultural frames must by design be higher in deductive analysis if coders are allowed to code ambiguous nuclear sentences to belong to opposite frame types at the same time (Hoeglinger 2016: 34) . Finally, there may be further explanation for the striking lack of cultural clusters in our analysis, which applies especially to the specific worker or union-related articles.
According to Statham and Trenz (2013: 132) , both pro-and anti-EU parties of the centre-right and the far right predominately used cultural justification frames during the French referendum debate. By contrast, left parties and unions almost exclusively used political, social and economic justification frames (see also Hoeglinger 2016: 155) . The use of cultural justification frames by the far-right is not surprising considering the alleged attractiveness of such frames for the 'losers of globalization' (Kriesi et al. 2008 (Kriesi et al. , 2012 . The use of cultural justification frames by centre-right winners of globalization, however, requires an explanation. In 2005, the Financial Times accused labour leaders who were supporting the No-camp during the French referendum of 'simple xenophobia' (Arnold 2005) . The New York Times explained French workers' growing Euroscepticism as hostile reaction to the 'Polish plumber' (Sciolino 2005) . As shown in Section 2 of our paper, however, the Polish plumber theorem has not been created by workers but by the centre-right EU Commissioner Bolkestein to discredit political opponents as xenophobes. This negative cultural framing of labour Euroscepticism proved to be much more influential than one would assume considering the results of both our inductive and existing deductive analyses of the salience of different frame types in EU politicization debates. The cultural framing of labour Euroscepticism became a widely accepted paradigm, even if some scholars want to extend the analysis 'to the type of culturally inclusive losers that mobilized against neoliberalism' (della Porta 2015: 8). Given our 'cosmopolitan' habitus as scholars, it is tempting to frame EU politicization debates as a conflict between enlightened elites and ethnocentric commoners. As self-reflective scholars, however, we should also be aware that such a framing of labour Euroscepticism may also reflect the interest of political entrepreneurs, such as Bolkestein, who prefer the politicization of the EU integration process along cultural rather than class lines. Classifications always entail 'classification struggle' effects that can result in imposing a particular vision of social divisions (Bourdieu 1989) . Accordingly, social classes are made and unmade all the time but never disappear (Hugrée et al. 2017; Schmidt 2015) .
This article aimed at getting a better understanding of labour's growing Euroscepticism based on a lexical analysis of the salience of different frame types in referendum debates, an analysis of union documents and interviews with union leaders. Our findings suggest that labour Euroscepticism is not driven by workers' supposedly strong attachment to primordial values. If labour Euroscepticism would be driven by workers' cultural attachment to their nation, as put forth by Hooghe and Marks (2006) , and Fligstein et al. (2012) , cultural terms and frames should have been driving the referendum debates. Yet, our comparative lexical analysis of the general and labourspecific debates demonstrated the continuing importance of socioeconomic terms across countries. In addition, our analysis of the three Irish referendum debates revealed a dramatic increase of the salience of socioeconomic terms over time. This does not mean, however, that debates about the free movement of workers do not influence workers' or union attitudes towards the EU. Migration did feature in media debates, union documents as well as our interviews with union officials. Strikingly, however, migration-related terms consistently appeared in 'socioeconomic' lexical classes, that is in conjunction with the CJEU's Laval judgments that undermined the social regulation of the free movement of posted workers. This also adds weight to the Schmidt's contention in relation to the UK's Brexit referendum (2016): Migration may have ended up as a 'scapegoat' for the real long-run problems caused by the turn to neoliberalism. The problem thus still seems to be a socioeconomic rather than a cultural one, namely one of the social failures of EU enlargement and one of the weakness of flanking measures against social dumping (Erne and Imboden 2015; Meardi 2012 (Hancké & Soskice, 2003: 153) . With the benefit of hindsight their argumentation changed again, emphasizing coordinated market economies' greater capacity to contain labour costs and to implement policy reforms that supported their export-led growth model (Carlin & Soskice, 2008; Hancké, 2013) . Be it as it may, varieties of capitalisms and growth models should have led to divergent labour movement views on EU integration along national lines (Brinegar et al. 2004) . Instead, both French and Irish unions became more Eurosceptic, while their sister parties in government signed up to the EU's new economic governance regime; despite contrary expectations namely in relation to France (Johnston & Regan, 2018: 153) .
